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Ultimately, as individuals we are all
helpless before the state, the collective power of
armies and governments, the voices that order us
to halt in the street. Or command that we push the
buzzer and let them up the stairs. When the group
that has come to get us is at the door, it is late to
. begin considering the possibilities of organized
opposition. But the knowledge of torture is itself
a political act, just as silence or ignorance of it
has political consequence. To speak of the
unspeakable is the beginning of action.
-Kate Millet'
In the wake of the ongoing "extrajudicial killings" of
journalists, political dissidents, and other civilians dubbed by several
military leaders as "enemies of the State,"2 the Philippine Supreme
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I KATE MILLET, THE POLITICS OF CRUELTY: AN ESSAY ON THE LITERATURE
OF POLITICAL IMPRISONMENT 296 (1995 ed.).
2 MELO COMMISSION REPORT 16, 19-29 (2007). This piece was originally
written in the latter part of 2006; however, as it turned out, developments in the
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Court issued Administrative Order 25-2007,' designating special
courts to hear, try, and decide cases involving killings of political
activists and members of media. Soon afterwards, Chief Justice
Reynato Puno declared that the Supreme Court will hold a multi-
sectoral summit on extrajudicial killings and set the stage for the
possible rewriting of Philippine legal procedures in order to facilitate
and expedite the prosecution of the perpetrators.4
The Supreme Court's initiatives are the first concrete proposals
to revise the current legal framework in order to address the problem
of extrajudicial killings in the Philippines. While the Chief Executive
had constituted the Melo Commission to conduct fact-finding
investigations (and the Commission's Report has already been made
public), the Chairman of the Commission himself declared that the
Commission's Report was "complete, but not final," in view of the
continuation of extrajudicial killings.' Significantly, the Melo
Commission Report itself recommends the drafting of a special law
for "strict chain-of-command responsibility:"
The President should propose legislation to require
police and military forces and other government officials
to maintain strict chain-of-command responsibility with
respect to extrajudicial killings and other offenses
committed by personnel under their command, control,
or authority. Such legislation must deal specifically with
political scene in the Philippines necessitated the inclusion in this paper of
matters beyond the yearbook's annual coverage, as in the case of the report cited
here. Nevertheless it was decided that the essay should still appear in the 2006
edition of the APYIHL as was originally intended by the author [eds.]
(Re: Designation of Special Courts to Hear, Try and Decide Cases
Involving Killings of Political Activists and Members of Media), I March 2007;
See Jay Rempi llo, SC Designates Special Courts for Extrajudicial Killings,
2 March 2007, available at: <http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/news/
courtnews%20flash/2007/03/03020703.php> (Last visited 2 June 2007).
Volt Contreras, SC to Hold Summit On Extrajudicial Killings, 23 June
2007, available at: <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view_
article.php?articleid=72925> (Last visited 26 June 2007).
1Thea Alberto, Melo: Commission Report 'Conplete'But Not 'Final'
Because of Continued Slays, 15 February 2007, available at: <http://newsinfo.
inquirer. net/breakingnews/nation/view article.php?articleid=49657> (Last
visited 25 June 2007).
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extralegal, arbitrary, and summary executions and forced
'disappearances' and provide appropriate penalties which
take into account the gravity of the offense. It should
penalize a superior government official, military, or
otherwise, who encourages, incites, tolerates, or ignores,
any extrajudicial killing committed by a subordinate. The
failure of such a government official to prevent an
extrajudicial killing, if he had a reasonable opportunity
to do so, or his failure to investigate and punish his
subordinate, or to otherwise take appropriate action to
deter or prevent its commission or punish his erring
subordinate would be criminalized. Even "general
information"-e.g. media reports-which would place
the superior on notice of possible unlawful acts by his
subordinate should be sufficient to hold him criminally
liable if he failed to investigate and punish his
subordinate.'
The foregoingjudicial and legislative responses to the problem
of extrajudicial killings in the Philippines make it imperative to revisit
the doctrine of command responsibility under international law, and
particularly as incorporated into Philippine law. Owing to the lack
of clarity on the precise content and elements of the doctrine of
command responsibility in Philippine jurisdiction, there has been
some reluctance to fully exhaust this doctrine as a species of
attribution for criminal prosecution in the Philippines. This should
not be the case. The doctrine of command responsibility is the
articulation of a global consensus that the architects of the most
egregious wartime atrocities, crimes against humanity, grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and serious violations of
human rights should not escape criminal legal sanction and
responsibility. As will be subsequently shown, considering the marked
provenance of the doctrine of command responsibility (traceable to
the Philippines, among otherjurisdictions), there is a greater impetus
for the doctrine to be fully utilized in the Philippine legal system.
6 MELO COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 71.
THE CONTOURS OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 229
Part I of this paper traces the historical contours of the doctrine
of command responsibility, its status as customary international law,
and its incorporation into Philippine law, as affirmed and articulated
in post-World War II cases decided by the Philippine Supreme Court.
Part II then examines the doctrinal nuances of command
responsibility as a form of derivative imputed criminal liabilityupon
superiors, scrutinizes the requirements of mens rea and actus reus
to satisfy legal attribution, and addresses the extent of the applicability
of the defense of "superior orders."
Part III discusses emerging refinements to the doctrine of
command responsibility from the recent rules and jurisprudence of
international criminal tribunals such as the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY.), the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Criminal Court
(ICC).
Part IV analyzes the applicability and limitations of the
command responsibility doctrine to the extrajudicial killings,
considering its present customary international law status and the
extent of its incorporation into Philippine law.
The paper draws several conclusions. First, the international
law doctrine of command responsibility is already incorporated into
Philippine law. Second, the elements of the doctrine as incorporated
into Philippine law are still those defined in World War IIjurisprudence,
namely, (1) command authority and responsibility between the
superior and the subordinate; (2) the existence of information
triggering an affirmative duty on the part of the commander; (3) the
superior's omissions, failure of supervision, or foreseeable negligence
and their causal nexus with the subordinate's crime; and (4) the
imputation to the superior of the same criminal liability and punishment
for which tht subordinate is liable. Third, while there is no legal
hindrance to utilizing the doctrine of command responsibility (as
presently incorporated into Philippine law) as basis to prosecute erring
superiors for extrajudicial killings in the Philippines, special legislation
may have to be passed to take into account the recent international
legal refinements to the doctrine ofcommand responsibility, particularly
on the nens rea, actus reus, and the penalty prescribed. Finally, the
paper concludes that the deliberate refusal to use the doctrine of
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command responsibility in Philippine jurisdiction amounts to a denial
ofjustice under international law, and a potential breach of a state's
duty, under the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, to prosecute
and punish those who commit violations of the laws of war and
crimes against humanity.
Historical Contours of Command Responsibility
and Incorporation into the Philippine Legal System
The concept of holding a superior or commander liable for the
conduct and acts of his subordinates can be documented as far back
as the fifteenth century, when Charles VII of France issued the
1439 Ordinance of Orleans, decreeing that captains or lieutenants
be held "responsible for the abuses, ills, and offenses committed by
members of his company," and that "as soon as he receives any
complaint concerning any such misdeed or abuse, he bring the
offender to justice." If these officials failed to do so, covered up the
misdeed, or were delayed in taking action, or if due to their negligence
the offender escapes or evades punishment, they are "deemed
responsible for the offense as if he had committed it himself and
punished in the same way as the offender would have been." A
similar formulation of the doctrine was widely used in other military
codes and articles of war throughout Europe.' In 1863, the United
States government enacted General Order No. 100, otherwise known
as the Lieber Code,' which permitted superiors to immediately punish
' Victor Hansen, What's Good for the Goose is Good for the Gander
Lessons from Abu Ghraib: Time for the United States to Adopt a Standard of
Command Responsibility Toward Its Own, 42 GoNz. L. REv. 335, 350-352
(2007); See Theodor Meron, Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by
International Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT'L. L. 555-559 (2006).
' The Lieber Code has been credited with containing many ofthe current
norms of the laws ofwar and international humanitarian law. See MARCO SASSOLI
AND ANTOINE A. BOUVIER, How DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? CASES,
DOCUMENTS AND TEACHING MATERIALS ON CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 101 (1999 ed.); GEOFFREY ROBERTSON,
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE, 171-172
(2000 ed.).
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subordinates with death (or such other severe punishment adequate
for the gravity of the offense) for committing "wanton violence
against persons in the invaded country," "destruction of property
not commanded by the authorized officer, all robbery, all pillage or
sacking, even after taking a place by main force, all rape, wounding,
maiming, or killing of such inhabitants." Superiors could be punished
with death if they "order or encourage" subordinates to intentionally
inflict "additional wounds on [an] enemy already wholly disabled."'
The 1907 Hague Conventions, already deemed to have the
status of customary international law,'o expressly provides for the
doctrine of command responsibility in the following articles of the
Fourth 1907 Hague Convention:"
HAGUE CONVENTION (No. IV)
Art. 1. The Contracting Powers shall issue
instructions to their armed land forces which shall be
in conformity with the Regulations respecting the laws
and customs of war on land, annexed to the present
Convention.
Art. 3. A belligerent party which violates the
provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case
demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be
responsible for all acts committed by persons forming
part of its armed forces.
' United States General Orders No. 100 (otherwise known as the 1863
Lieber Code), Articles 44 and 71, available at: <http://www.civilwarhome.com/
liebercode.htm>.
" Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 ICJ 226,
para. 75 at 256 (8 July).
" Hague Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, 18 October 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910, Articles I and 3;
Annex: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Ch. 1,
Article 1.
232 ASIA-PACIFIC YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
ANNEX: REGULATIONS RESPECTING THE LAWS
AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON LAND
Chapter 1: The Qualifications of Belligerents
Art. 1. The laws, rights, and duties of war apply
not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer
corps fulfilling the following conditions:
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for
his subordinates;
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable
at a distance;
3. To carry arms openly; and
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with
the laws and customs of war.
In countries where militia or volunteer corps
constitute the army, or form part of it, they are included
under the denomination "army" [emphasis supplied].
The foregoing provisions of the Fourth Hague Convention
and its Annex fully recognize the distinct relationship and unique
command structure between superiors and subordinates in a military
organization, and categorically impose responsibility for all the acts
of subordinates in military conflicts.
Following World War I, an international commission was
formed which proposed command responsibility for both civilian and
military leaders for their failure to prevent or repress violations of the
laws of war, when such leaders possessed the power to intervene
but did not exercise it. This proposal did not reach codification. It
was only in the aftermath of World War II, with the landmark decisions
of international military tribunals, 2 that the elements of the doctrine
" See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 228-235
(2' ed., 1999); Judgement of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) of
0
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of command responsibility were explicitly delineated. Of particular
salience to the Philippines is the landmark case of In Re Yamashita,
where the United States Supreme Court upheld the Philippine
Supreme Court's denial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita's petition
for habeas corpus, and affirmed the jurisdiction and authority of the
military commission before which General Yamashita was charged
with numerous violations of the laws of war. In Re Yamashita
encapsulates the United States Supreme Court's famous articulation
of the principle of command responsibility thus:
It is not denied that such acts directed against the
civilian population of an occupied country and against
prisoners of war are recognized in international law as
violations of the law of war. Articles 4, 28, 46, and 47,
Annex to Fourth Hague Convention, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277,
2296,2303,2306, and 2307. But it is urged that the charge
does not allege that petitioner has either committed or
directed the commission of such acts, and consequently
that no violation is charged as against him. But this
overlooks the fact that the gist of the charge is an
unlawful breach of duty by petitioner as an army
commander to control the operations of the members
of his command by "permitting them to commit" the
extensive and widespread atrocities specified. The
question then is whether the law of war imposes on an
army commander a duty to take such appropriate
measures as are within his power to control the troops
under his command for the prevention of the specified
acts which are violations of the law of war and which
are likely to attend the occupation of hostile territory by
an uncontrolled soldiery, and whether he may be charged
with personal responsibility for his failure to take such
Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita [hereinafter, Yamashita]; Nuremburg Judgment, United
States v Wilhelm von Leeb; Nuremburg Judgment, United States v. Wilhelm List;
Judgment, International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Trials), full
texts available at: <http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/trials.htm>.
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measures when violations result. That this was the
precise issue to be tried was made clear by the statement
of the prosecution at the opening of the trial.
It is evident that the conduct of military operations
by troops whose excesses are unrestrained by the orders
or efforts of their commander would almost certainly
result in violations which it is the purpose of the law of
war to prevent. Its purpose to protect civilian populations
and prisoners of war from brutality would largely be
defeated if the commander of an invading army could
with impunity neglect to take reasonable measures for
their protection. Hence the law of war presupposes that
its violation is to be avoided through the control of the
operations of war by commanders who are to some
extent responsible for their subordinates.
This is recognized by the Annex to Fourth Hague
Convention of 1907, respecting the laws and customs
of war on land. Article I lays down as a condition which
an armed force must fulfill in order to be accorded the
rights of lawful belligerents, that it must be "commanded
by a person responsible for his subordinates." 36 Stat.
2295. Similarly Article 19 ofthe Tenth Hague Convention,
relating to bombardment by naval vessels, provides that
commanders in chief of the belligerent vessels "must
see that the above Articles are properly carried out."
36 Stat. 2389. And Article 26 of the Geneva Red Cross
Convention of 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, 2092, for the
amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick
in armies in the field, makes it "the duty of the
commanders-in-chief of the belligerent armies to
provide for the details of execution of the foregoing
articles (of the convention), as well as for unforeseen
cases." And, finally, Article 43 of the Annex of the
Fourth Hague Convention, 36 Stat. 2306, requires that
the commander of a force occupying enemy territory,
as was petitioner, "shall take all the measures in his power
to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order
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and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country."
These provisions plainly imposed on petitioner,
who at the time specified was military governor of the
Philippines, as well as commander of the Japanese
forces, an affirmative duty to take such measures
as were within his power and appropriate in the
circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the
civilian population. This duty of a commanding officer
has heretofore been recognized, and its breach penalized,
by our own military tribunals. A like principle has been
applied so as to impose liability on the United States in
international arbitrations. (Case ofJenaud, 3 Moore,
International Arbitrations, 3000; Case of 'The Zafiro,'
5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 707).
Failure of an officer to take measures to prevent
murder of an inhabitant of an occupied country
committed in his presence. Gen. Orders No. 221, Hq.
Div. of the Philippines, August 17, 1901. And in General
Orders No. 264, Hq. Div. of the Philippines, September
9, 1901, it was held that an officer could not be found
guilty for failure to prevent a murder unless it appeared
that the accused had "the power to prevent" it"
[emphasis and italics supplied].
The common discernible elements of command responsibility
from decisions of the World War II international military tribunals
are:
1. Relationship: the existence of lines of
command authority and responsibility
between the superior and subordinate. These
lines are less important, however, in situations
of occupation since the commanding authority's
" 327 U.S. I (1946).
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responsibility is broad and general, and not simply
limited to the control of units directly supervised
by the commanding authority. Occupying
authorities are charged with maintaining peace
and order, punishing crime, and protecting the
lives and property of inhabitants in the occupied
territory. 4
2. Mens rea. the existence of information that
triggers an affirmative duty on the part of the
superior to act, and/or seek out further
information. In Yamashita, the United States
Supreme Court explicitly recognized that the laws
of war impose an affirmative duty on commanders
to control their forces, based on Articles I and
43 of the Annex to the Fourth Hague Convention
of 1907." In United States v. Wilhelm von
Leeb,' 6 (otherwise known as the "High
Command Case"), the international tribunal
required that the superior must have had either
actual knowledge of the offenses committed by
his subordinates, and either acquiesced, partici-
pated, or criminally neglected to interfere in order
to prevent the commission of such offenses. The
Nuremberg trial of United States v. William
List, " (the "Hostage Case") noted that a
commander's failure to acquaint himself with
the contents of reports on offenses by subordi-
nates, and his failure to require additional reports
to investigate the incidents, was a dereliction of
See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied
Palestinian Territory, 2004 ICJ (9 July).
1 Id., at note 15.
'
6United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb, 12 LRTWC I at 59 (1948). Full texts
available at: <http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/trials.htm>.
".United States v. Wilhelm List. Full texts available at: <http://www.
ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/trials.htm>.
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his affirmative duty as a superior. Finally, the
various judgements of the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East in the Tokyo Trials"
commonly held that the superior's duty to act to
prevent the commission of such crimes and to
punish the perpetrators is triggered by: (a) his
actual knowledge of the commission of such
crimes; (b) the superior's imputed or construc-
tive knowledge of the subordinates' commission
of offenses due to the scale and frequency of
the offenses or the presence of official reports
and reportage; or (c) the superior's negligence
to obtain knowledge of the commission of such
offenses under circumstances such as failure of
supervision over subordinate conduct, or the
continuous and efficient operation of command
oversight.
3. Actus reus: the acts or omissions of the superior
in relation to his subordinates' offenses. Once
the affirmative duty to act has been triggered, the
superior has to take immediate and positive steps
to control his forces and address his subordinates'
offenses. These may include: (a) taking discipli-
nary and corrective measures or other steps
throughout the command structure to prevent
the commission of further atrocities; (b) establish-
ing a system that secures proper conduct by
subordinates and protection of the civilian
population; and (c) causing the immediate
prosecution of the subordinates reported to have
committed such offenses." Failure to take these
measures would establish the superior's personal
" M. CHERIF BASIlOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 233 (2"" ed.,
1999).
" BASSIOUNI, supra note 14, at 233.
238 ASIA-PACIFIC YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
dereliction or neglect, even amounting to
acquiescence in some cases.2 0 In the words of
the international military tribunal in the High
Command case, there must be "a personal
neglect amounting to a wanton, immoral
disregard of the action of his subordinates
amounting to acquiescence."
4. Imputed liability: the superior incurs the same
criminal liability as if he personally committed
the offenses with his subordinates. The
international military tribunals during World War
II generally imposed the same punishment (death
or imprisonment) on superiors found to be liable
under command responsibility for their subor-
dinates' grave breaches of the laws of war, the
1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1907 Hague
Conventions, and commission of torture and
crimes against humanity. The imposition of the
same level and degree of punishment was
rationalized under the superior's fundamental
obligation to control and organize their subor-
dinates in a manner that maximizes the
maintenance of discipline and the prevention of
egregious offenses against humanity and the laws
of nations. (The disproportional ity between the
punishment imposed for a superior's serious
omissions and the level of heinousness
accompanying the subordinates' actual commis-
sions of the offenses, has expectedly come under
severe criticism from criminal law theorists.)2 1
20 See STEVEN R. RATNER, AND JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBURG
LEGACY 132-133 (2' ed., 2001).
2 Mirjan Damaska, The Shadow Side ofCommand Responsibility, 49 AM.
J. CoMp. L. 455, 479-480 (2001); Arthur O'Reilly, Command Responsibility: A
Call to Realign Doctrine with Principles, 20 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 88-100 (2004).
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Under the foregoing conceptual elements, the doctrine of
command responsibility has gained the status of customary
international law.22 It is this formulation of the doctrine of command
responsibility, arising from or traceable to the Hague Conventions
as seen in thejurisprudence of the World War II international military
tribunals, that is deemed incorporated in the Philippine legal system.
In its landmark 1949 decision in Kuroda v. Jalandoni,23 the
Philippine Supreme Court explicitly declared the Hague Conventions
and the Geneva Conventions as part of the generally accepted
principles of international law that, by Constitutional fiat, form part
of the law of the land:
Petitioner argues that respondent Military
Commission has nojurisdiction to try petitioner for acts
committed in violation of the Hague Convention and
the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not
a signatory to the first and signed the second only in
1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations
of the Hague and Geneva Conventions form part of
and are wholly based on the generally accepted
principles of international law. In fact, these rules and
principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations,
the United States and Japan, who were signatories to
the two Conventions. Such rules and principles,
therefore, form part of the law of our nation even
if the Philippines was not a signatory to the
conventions embodying them, for our Constitution
22 See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 84-85 (2001 ed.), citing United States ofAmerica v. Yamashita
(1948) 4 LRTWC 1, pp. 36-7; In re Yamashita, 327 US 1 (1945); Canada v.
Meyer, (1948) 4 LRTWC 98 (Canadian Military Court); Protocol Additional I to
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Article 86(2); Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, UN Doc. S/RES/827, Annex, Article 7(3);
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,UN Doc. S/RES/955,
Annex, Article 6(3); See also Christopher Greenwood, Command Responsibility
and the Hadzihasanovic Decision, 2 J. INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 598, 603-605 (2004).
23 G.R. No. L-2662, 26 March 1949.
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has been deliberately general and extensive in its
scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules
and principles of international law as contained in
treaties to which our government may have been or
shall be a signatory [emphasis and italics supplied].
In the strong language of concurring Justice Perfecto in
Yamashita v. Styer,24 the absence of any specific statute is not a
bar to the prosecution of those committing serious war crimes and
crimes against humanity:
(7) That in violation of the law of nations, the
offended party is the people of the whole world, and
the case against petitioner could be properly entitled
as "Humanity versus Tomoyuki Yamashita," and no
person in position to prosecute the violators can honestly
shirk the responsibility of relentlessly prosecuting them,
lest he be branded with the stigma of complicity.
(8) That the absence of a codified International
Penal Code or of a criminal law adopted by the comity
of nations, with specific penalties for-specific and well-
defined international crimes, is not a- bar to the
prosecution of war criminals, as all civilized nations
have provided in their laws the necessary punishment
for war crimes which, for their very nature, cease to
be lawful acts of war, and become ordinary crimes
with the extraordinary character of having been
committed in connection with war, which should be
considered as an aggravating circumstance [emphasis
and italics supplied].
The Philippine Supreme Court has applied the concept of a
superior's "fault or negligence" (and rejected a strict liability
" G.R. No. L-129, 19 December 1945, 75 Phil 563, at 596 (Perfecto, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
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standard to impute liability on superiors) under the doctrine of
command responsibility in several cases subsequent to Yamashita
and Kuroda.25 With the absence of any subsequent cases directly
applying the doctrine of command responsibility since Yamashita
and Kuroda, however, the High Court has not had the occasion to
articulate any modifications to the content of the doctrine as
incorporated in the Philippine legal system. It may therefore be
argued, with some plausibility, that the customary status of the
doctrine still lies with the conceptual elements traceable to the 1907
Hague Conventions and as affirmed in the jurisprudence of the
World War II international military tribunals.
Doctrinal Nuances of Command Responsibility
as Derivative Imputed Criminal Liability
The doctrine of command responsibility is an inevitable
corollary to the state's primary duty to control the conduct of its
armed forces. This same state duty underlies the various
constitutional provisions26 demarcating the role of the armed forces
and its subordination to civilian supremacy.
Notwithstanding the constitutional weight accorded to the
state's duty to control the conduct of its armed forces, however,
the imposition of criminal liability under the command responsibility
doctrine has met with some resistance. Contrary to orthodox or
traditional formulations in domestic criminal law, a superior's
criminal liability under the doctrine of command responsibility is
not based on his overt acts of participation, inducement, or
complicity. Rather, the doctrine of command responsibility is a
species of derivative imputed criminal liability-where the superior
25 See Aberca et al. v Ver et al., G.R. No. L-69866, 15 April 1988;
Kapunan Jr et al. v. De Villa et al., G R. No. 83177, 6 December 1988; People v.
Lucero et al., GR. Nos. 64323-24, 31 May 1991 ; See also Reyes et al. v. Rural
Bank of San Miguel et al., GR. No. 154499, 27 February 2004; Quimsing v
Lachica, et al., G.R. No. L-14683, 30 May 1961.
261987 CONST., Article 2, § 3; Article 7, § 18; Article 16, §§4-6.
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is deemed to bear the "same" degree of criminal "culpability" by
failing to prevent and/or punish his/her subordinate's commission
of serious international war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture,
and egregious human rights violations. The superior's crime is one
of omission, but the superior is made to suffer the same penalties
as if he/she had committed the crime/s with his/her subordinate.
To borrow from standard Revised Penal Code phraseology, this is
the highest degree of "criminal negligence" or "reckless imprudence"
punished with the same penalty as actual "commission" of serious
international crimes. The rationale for this strict and distinct form
of derivative imputed criminal liability is that "had the superior officer
exercised his command authority properly, [such] offenses [e.g.
international human rights violations, crimes against humanity, grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, torture, and other serious
international crimes] would not have taken place."27
The foregoing rationale, however, will not result in an
"automatic" or "formulaic" application of the doctrine of command
responsibility. As will be subsequently shown, resistance to the
application of the doctrine of command responsibility to Philippine
jurisdiction rests on threshold nuances (and criticisms)
accompanying each of the elements of the doctrine. These nuances
stem from a mistaken predisposition to analogize standard precepts
of domestic criminal law to the doctrine. As seen from its status as
customary international law, however, the doctrine of command
responsibility should be seen as a species of derivative criminal
liability that is deliberately separate and distinct from the concept
of individualized criminal liability. Both spheres of criminal liability,
however, can coexist in Philippine jurisdiction.
The command authority relationship between superior and
subordinate. In a recent press statement," the Executive Secretary
publicly declared that the doctrine of command responsibility is
27 Greenwood, supra note 24, at 599, 604.
28 Lira Dalangin-Fernandez. Command Responsibility Does Not Cover
Arroyo-Ermita, 27 June 2007, available at: <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/
breakingnews/nation/view-article.phparticleid=73553>.
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"qualified" and does not extend to civilian superiors such as the
President.
The foregoing contentions have no basis in customary
international law. The customary international law doctrine of
command responsibility clearly embraces civilian, as well as military,
superiors. 29 The World War II international jurisprudence on the
doctrine of command responsibility (as incorporated into Philippine
jurisdiction) already contemplated the application of the doctrine to
civilian superiors. For example, the Tokyo trial of Koki Hirota (a
diplomat and civilian who served as foreign minister) before the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East affirmed the doctrine
of command responsibility, and held Hirota liable for "criminal
negligence" and dereliction of duty by failing to prevent and/or
cause the investigation and punishment of wartime atrocities.
Likewise, the Nuremberg trial of Hermann Roechling (a German
steel industry executive in charge of various production facilities
during World War II) also applied the doctrine of command
responsibility to convict Roechling for preparing to undertake a
war of aggression, undertaking aggressive war, and mistreating
workers supplied by the German armed forces and state police.30
Ultimately, what is determinative of the existence of command
authority between the superior and subordinate is the presence of
"hierarchy," or whether the superior has "effective control" over
subordinates." Effective control is defined as the "material ability
to prevent or punish the commission of offenses," and can exist
even "without formal authority" so long as the superior has de
facto control over the conduct of the subordinates committing serious
29 Greg R. Vetter, Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in
the International Criminal Court, 25 YALE J. INT'L. L. 89, at 104 (2000); See
also Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, Milosevic (IT-02-54), 16
June 2004, Trial Chamber, § 143 et seq.
30 See also Jared Olanoff, Holding a Head ofState Liablefor War Crimes:
Command Responsibility and the Milosevic Trial, 27 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
REv. 327, at 339-340 (2004).
" See Kayishema and Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1; ICTR-96-10), Trial
Chamber 11, 21 May 1999, § §208-231.
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international crimes." While the existence of effective control is
indeed a factual determination that will depend on the circumstances,
it should likewise be borne in mind that customary international law
has long rejected the immunization or insulation of heads of state
and other "official" state actors from criminal responsibility for
serious international crimes."
Mens Rea Requirement: the existence of "information" that
triggers the superior's affirmative duty to act. The doctrine of
command responsibility is not a theory of strict liability. Rather, a
superior is criminally liable under the doctrine ofcommand responsi-
bility where he/she has: (a) actual knowledge that his/her subordi-
nates were committing serious international crimes, and despite
such knowledge, the superior failed to take steps to prevent the
commission of such crimes or punish the subordinates; (b) imputed
knowledge of the subordinates' commission of such crimes where
he/she is in receipt of information, official or otherwise, about his/
her subordinates' acts, but his/her failure to acquaint himself/herself
with such information amounts to "willful blindness;" or (c) the
superior shows negligence in obtaining knowledge on his/her
subordinates' commission of the serious international crimes, under
circumstances describing the superior's fault in failing to acquire
such knowledge. In any of these three variations of inens rea, the
superior's affirmative duty to act (to either prevent the commission
of offenses or punish the subordinates/perpetrators) is triggered.
Failure to fulfill this affirmative duty results in criminally culpable
conduct.
" David L. Nersessian, Whoops! I Conunitted Genocide: The Anomaly of
Constructive Liabilityfor Serious International Crimes, 30 SUM-FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 81, 88-89 (2006); See Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and
Command Responsibility, 5 J. INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 159, 179-178 (March 2007).
" Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in Chief? 81 IND.
L.J. 1145, 1152-1153, 1162-1163 (2006); See Judgment of the International
Military Tribunal ofNuremberg, 30 September 1946; Eichmann Case, 36 I.L.R. 5,
(1961); Ex Parte Pinochet, No. 3 (2000); See also The Prosecutor v Dusko
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999), International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia.
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Clearly, the mens rea of a superior liable under the doctrine
of command responsibility is not the same as the mens rea of the
subordinates who commit serious international crimes. There is no
need to prove a common design, intent, or enterprise between the
superior and the subordinate to hold both equally liable for the penalty
prescribed for serious international crimes. The superior's mens
rea is ultimately a problem of "foreseeability," or the extent by
which the superior "knew or had reason to know" that his/her
subordinates committed, or were about to commit, serious
international crimes. 3 4
The concept of criminal liability for omissions by means of
fault or culpa (resulting from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight, or lack of skill) is not alien to Philippine criminal law.35
The objection to the superior's mens rea in the doctrine of command
responsibility is the treatment of his/her moral depravity as being
"constructively equal" to that of the subordinates perpetrating
serious international crimes. By traditional Philippine criminal law
standards, negligence or recklessness resulting in death (homicide)
is penalized with a lesser penalty than the intentional felony of
homicide. However, in the customary international law doctrine of
command responsibility as incorporated into Philippine jurisdiction,
the superior's negligence is basis to hold him/her "equally liable"
for his/her subordinates' actual commission of serious international
crimes.
Thus, the criticism against the mens rea requirement for
superiors in the doctrine of command responsibility is not against
its existence per se, but rather against its presumed "proportionality"
or comparability with the mens rea of subordinates actually
committing serious international crimes. Admittedly, there is some
theoretical basis to hold that negligence is a "weak" basis for criminal
liability under the retributive theory of criminal law. Negligence
" See Jens David Ohlin, Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of
Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 69, 81-85 (March 2007).
* REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 3; See FLORENz D. REGALADO,
CRIMINAL LAW CONSPECTus 13-14 (2003 ed.).
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has been criminally outlawed as a matter of deterrence, and not in
"retribution" for the evil intent of "guilty minds."3 6 "Proportionality"
disputes, however, should not affect the existence of a superior's
criminal liability under the doctrine of command responsibility under
customary international law. The question of proportionality is an
issue of lexferenda" that bypasses the doctrine as lex lata, and
as incorporated under Philippine jurisdiction. As such, there can be
no legal hindrance to the application in Philippine jurisdiction of the
mens rea requirement, as defined under the customary international
law doctrine of command responsibility and incorporated in Philippine
jurisdiction.
Actus Reus: Omission by the superior to prevent the
subordinates' commission of serious international crimes, or to
punish subordinates for such crimes. The doctrine of command
responsibility is unique from other types of derivative or imputed
criminal liability in international law (such asjoint criminal enterprises
as defined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court)
in that command responsibility only entails an omission, and not
any overt act of participation, inducement, or complicity. The doctrine
holds the superior criminally liable for his/her failure to act, where
he/she had the affirmative duty, and the corresponding ability, to:
(a) prevent his/her subordinates from committing future serious
international crimes; (b) stop his subordinates from committing such
crimes; or (c) punish his/her subordinates for the commission of
past crimes.
From the vantage point of Philippine criminal law, there should
be little conceptual difficulty with this element of the doctrine of
command responsibility. Philippine criminal law also provides for
culpable felonies by omission." Under the customary international
law doctrine of command responsibility as incorporated into
3 O'Reilly, supra note 23, at 92-95.
* See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND How WE USE IT (1995 ed.)
* See REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 3; Calimutan v. People, et al., G.R.
No. 152133, 9 February 2006.
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Philippine jurisdiction, the extent of a superior's omission can be
ascertained in relation to his/her relative capability to discharge his
affirmative duty to prevent, stop, and punish his/her subordinates
for the commission of serious international crimes.
If at all, therefore, the critique against this element of the
doctrine is again an issue of proportionality, due to a preference to
impose heavier penalties for "committed" felonies rather than
felonies by omission. As previously shown, however, this argument
on "proportionality" is an irrelevant lex ferenda concern more
properly directed to Philippine legislators. For purposes of
implementing the doctrine of command responsibility as incorporated
in Philippine jurisdiction, there should be no legal hindrance to a
judicial appraisal of the element of actus reus according to the
above-described customary international law standards.
Imputed Liability: The same penalty for the superior as for
the subordinate. The customary international law doctrine of
command responsibility, as incorporated in Philippine jurisdiction,
imposes the same penalty on the superior as that imposed on the
subordinate committing serious international crimes. This is perhaps
the most contentious element of the doctrine, since traditional criminal
law theorists could ground their "proportionality" objections on penal
philosophical theories such as self-defense, deterrence, exemplarity,
retribution, reformation, orjustice.39
It would be difficult, however, to ignore the weight of the
Supreme Court's categorical affirmation of the doctrine of
command responsibility in Yamashita and Kuroda. Until the content
of customary international law can be seen as having modified the
scope of punishment imposed on the superior for his/her criminal
negligence, the customary international law status of the doctrine
of command responsibility remains as described in thejurisprudence
of the World War II tribunals. (As will be shown in Part III, there
11 FLORENz D. REGALADO, CRIMINAL LAW CONSPECTUS 124 (2003 ed.);
See Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity for International Punishment:
The Limits ofthe National Law Analogy and the Potential ofInternational Criminal
Law, 43 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 39 (2007).
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is still considerable debate-militating against the attainment of
customary status-of recent refinements to the doctrine of
command responsibility from Additional Protocol I to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, the statutes and jurisprudence of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court.)
Thus, as seen from the foregoing discussion of the nuances
to the elements of the doctrine of command responsibility, there is
no legal hindrance to the doctrine's application in Philippine
jurisdiction. The proper analytical approach in applying the doctrine
of command responsibility is to treat it as a separate and distinct
regime for deriving criminal liability of superiors, outside of the
traditional schema of individualized criminal responsibility under
domestic criminal law. As previously shown, there is no real conflict
between the customary norm on command responsibility and
Philippine criminal law. (In fact, the elements of the doctrine bear
conceptual similarities with Philippine penal concepts.) Philippine
criminal law itself is silent, or at best, contains a "void" on the
specific criminal responsibility of superiors for their subordinates'
commission of serious international crimes.40 Thus, in recognition
of the doctrine as a generally accepted principle of international
40 See Executive Order No. 226 (Institutionalization of the Doctrine of
"Command Responsibility" in All Government Offices, Particularly at All Levels
of Command in the Philippine National Police and All Law Enforcement Agencies),
17 February 1995, which provides for administrative liability for command
responsibility in the following pro visions:
Section 1. Neglect of Duty Under the Doctrine of "Command
Responsibility."-Any government official or supervisor, or officer of
the Philippine National Police or that of any other law enforcement
agency shall be held accountable for "Neglect of Duty" under the doctrine
of "command responsibility" if he has knowledge that a crime or offense
shall be committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his
subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite
such knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either
before, during, or immediately after its commission.
Section 2. Presumption of Knowledge.-A government official
or supervisor, or PNP commander, is presumed to have knowledge of the
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law that "forms part of the laws of the land,"4' it is entirely
permissible to deem the doctrine of command responsibility as a
separate and distinct regime to derive the criminal liability of
superiors.
commission of irregularities or criminal offenses in any of the following
circumstances:
a. When the irregularities or illegal acts are widespread within
his area ofjurisdiction;
b. When the irregularities or illegal acts have been repeatedly or
regularly committed within his area ofresponsibility; or
c. When members of his immediate staff or office personnel are
involved.
Section 4. Administrative Liability.-Any violation of this
Executive Order by any government official, supervisor, officer of the
PNP and that ofany law enforcement agency shall be held administratively
accountable for violation ofexisting laws, rules and regulations [emphasis
and italics supplied].
41 1987 CONST., Article II, §. 2; See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAw (2003 ed.), especially, Chapter 2 on The Relation ofMunicipal
and International Law; See also Secretary of Justice v. Lantion et al., G.R.
No. 139465, 1 8 January 2000, which held that:
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribu-
nals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears
to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to
harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that
municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted
principles of international law in observance ofthe Incorporation Clause in
the above-cited constitutional provision (CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW,
1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable
and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal
law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts (Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales
v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for
the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly
bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact
that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not
pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or
municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as
applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given
equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect-a
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Finally, considering that the customary international law
doctrine of command responsibility as incorporated into Philippine
jurisdiction will be implemented as a separate and distinct regime
for deriving criminal responsibility of superiors, will the legal
justification of "obedience to superior orders" in domestic criminal
law42 be applicable to insulate the subordinates committing serious
international crimes from criminal liability? If the legal justification
is not applicable, could superiors still be held liable for issuing patently
illegal (void or legally inexistent) orders?
The classic paradox is explained by one of the established
publicists of international laws thus:
If we examine the well-known doctrines under
the laws of war of "command responsibility" and
"superior orders is no defense," we find that their
combination leads to an unexpected conceptual
paradox. Suppose that A, a military commander, issues
an order to his subordinate B that is clearly illegal under
the laws of war. (For example, the order may be to
execute prisoners of war, or to kill civilians in the
absence of military necessity.) If B carries out the
order, B is criminally liable under the Nuremberg
precedents and humanitarian law as the perpetrator of
a criminal act. Should B attempt to defend his action
on the ground that he was following orders, the tribunal
will respond that the order was illegal and hence should
not have been obeyed. Now suppose, however, that A
is accused of issuing the order that was in fact obeyed
and that in fact resulted in the commission of the crime
by B. Under the applicable precedents regarding
command responsibility, A would be held criminally
treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states
where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic
of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they
are in conflict with the constitution.
42 REVISED PENAL CODE, Article I1, para. 6.
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liable. But herein lies the paradox: A can contend that
the order was concededly illegal, that it should not have
been carried out, and the situation is thus equivalent to
there having been no order at all. Indeed, A argues, if B
was denied the defense of superior orders, because A's
order was illegal, then the responsibility for the criminal
act was entirely B's. No additional responsibility should
be attributed to A."43
Consistent with the Nuremberg precedents and other World
War II jurisprudence on command responsibility, the paradox is
resolved by framing the superior's responsibility not from mere
issuance of the order alone, but more so from his/her failure to prevent
or stop his/her subordinate from committing the serious international
cnme:
If we look at the concept of command responsi-
bility as it has been developed through multilateral
conventions and in customary law as recognized by the
Nuremberg and Far East tribunals, we find that it contains
two necessary elements: (1) that the commander knew
or should have known of the commission of the war
crime, and (2) that he was capable of inhibiting or
preventing it. Under these rules, let us again suppose
that A issues an order to B to commit a war crime. The
order itself, as we have seen, is illegal and hence invalid.
But it nevertheless has evidentiary value under the first
of the two elements of command responsibility: the fact
that he gave the order means that A knew or should
have known of the commission of the war crime.
However, A's order does not prove the second of
the two elements of command responsibility-that A
was capable of preventing or inhibiting the commission
" Anthony D'Amato, Superior Orders vs. Conunand Responsibility, 80
Am. J. INT'L. L. 604 (1986).
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of the war crime. Does the fact of the order estop A to
defend on the ground of incapability? The answer must
be negative, because capability is a function of the
military command structure and the military context,
factors that are not necessarily within A's control. The
question, in short, is whether A wanted or did not want
B to commit the war crime, but whether A could have
stopped or hindered B from doing so. The prosecutor's
burden of proof on this latter issue is not discharged by
simply introducing A's order into evidence; ratherfacts
must be adduced about A 's actual power to affect
B ' actions.
The initial paradox is thus resolved. The doctrines
of "command responsibility" and "no defense of superior
orders" are not incompatible with the results of actual
cases, and they are not mutually inconsistent. But the
liability of the military commander cannot be predicated
upon his order alone, for what this analysis has shown is
that the element of capability of controlling subordinates
must be proven independently.44
It is submitted that the legal justification of "superior orders"
under the Revised Penal Code cannot insulate subordinates-
perpetrators from criminal liability. In the first place, the legal
justification presumes a valid or lawful order. The execution of orders
that are facially unlawful, however, cannot be legallyjustified.45 More
importantly, the customary international law status on command
responsibility (as seen from the jurisprudence of the World War II
tribunals) itself shows a consistent rejection of the defense of superior
orders. Both domestic criminal law and customary international law
harmoniously reject the defense of superior orders for patently illegal
orders involving the commission of serious international crimes and
crimes against humanity.
" Id., at 607-608 [emphasis supplied].
" See Ramos v. Sandiganbayan et al., GR. No. 58876, 27 November
1990.
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With the denial of the defense of superior orders, however,
criminal liability for serious international crimes is not absorbed
solely by the subordinates-perpetrators. Precisely because the
customary international legal doctrine of command responsibility
as incorporated in the Philippines requires treatment as a separate
and distinct regime for deriving criminal liability of superiors in the
Philippines, the (deliberate or inadvertent) architects of serious
international crimes cannot escape criminal responsibility. Insofar
as the present content of the customary international law doctrine
of command responsibility is concerned, the superior who fails and/
or neglects to supervise and control the conduct of his/her
subordinates (in order to prevent, stop, or punish the commission of
serious international crimes) is criminally culpable to the same
degree as the subordinates who committed such crimes. The
justification for this parallel imposition of liability on the superior
stands under the customary norm: these serious international crimes
"would not otherwise have been committed" had the superior
exercised the highest vigilance during his/her watch.
Emerging Refinements to the Doctrine of Command
Responsibility: Post World War II Developments
The doctrine of command responsibility has undergone
various refinements since World War II. The customary status of
these "refinements," given the divergence of state practice and
opinion juris, is still the subject of considerable debate.46 As such,
while there is no legal hindrance to applying the doctrine of command
responsibility under its present customary status within Philippine
jurisdiction, the ongoing "refinements" to the doctrine cannot be
deemed incorporated into the Philippine legal system. The following
synthesis of current "refinements" is based on international
instruments where the Philippines is not (or yet) a party. They may
6 See Fergal Gaynor and Barbara Goy, Current Developments at the Ad
Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 544 (May 2007).
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be of interest to the Philippine Legislature, should it prefer to depart
from the current status of the customary international law norm of
the doctrine (based on World War II jurisprudence and the 1907
Hague Conventions as articulated in Yamashita and Kuroda) in
order to enact legislation specifically adopting these emergent
standards.
Articles 86 to 87 of Additional Protocol I
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (AP 1)
The Philippines has not yet signed the AP I. Article 86 of
AP I provides liability in case of "failure to act." In this case, a
superior is liable where: 1) he/she fails to repress grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions or to take necessary measures to
suppress all other breaches of the Conventions; and 2) the superior
knew, or had information which should have enabled him/her to
conclude that the subordinate was committing, or was going to
commit, such a breach. On the other hand, Article 87 of AP I
explicitly specifies the duty of commanders with respect to "forces
under their command," and "other persons under their control."
Such commanders are required to: 1) prevent, suppress, and report
to competent authorities breaches of the Geneva Conventions and
AP I; 2) commensurate with their level of responsibility, ensure
that their subordinates are aware of their obligations under the
Conventions and AP I; 3) if the superior is aware that a breach of
the Conventions is or will be committed, he/she must initiate steps
to prevent violations and initiate disciplinary or penal action against
the subordinate. Finally, under AP I, the prescribed punishment for
the superior is not the same as for the actual commission of war
crimes by the subordinate.4 7
" Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol 11), 1125 UNTS 609, entered into force 7 December 1978, Articles 86
and 87.
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Statute and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal
Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute formulates the doctrine of
command responsibility, thus:
The fact that any of the acts referred to in
Articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute [Grave Breaches
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Crimes Against
Humanity] was committed by a subordinate does not
relieve his superior of criminal responsibility ifhe knew
or had reason to know that the subordinate was
about to commit such acts or had done so and the
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent such acts or to punish the
perpetrators thereof' [emphasis and italics supplied].
The foregoing phraseology is virtually identical to article 6(3)
of the ICTR Statute:
The fact that any of the acts referred to in
Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute [Genocide and
Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol II] was committed
by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of
criminal responsibility ifhe or she knew or had reason
to know that the subordinate was about to commit
such acts or had done so and the superior failed to
take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators
thereof' [emphasis and italics supplied].
Statute of the International Tribunal, adopted by S.C. Res. 827, UN
SCOR, 48th Sess., 321 7th mtg. at 6, UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), Article 7(3), 32
1.L.M. 1203 (1993).
" Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, (as amended in
1998,2000,2002, and 2003) UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994); Article 6(3)33 ILM 1598.
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Under both statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR, the mens rea
requirement is either: (1) actual knowledge; or (2) imputed knowledge
("had reason to know") that the subordinate was about to commit
such acts or had done so. In the Celebicijudgment,so the ICTY held
that a superior's duty to act would only be triggered if he/she had
"specific information available to him/her" which would "put him/
her on notice" about the conduct of his/her subordinates. On the
other hand, in the Akayesu judgment,' the ICTR held that a superior
had the duty "to obtain information about the conduct of his/her
subordinates," and the ensuing duty to act on such information.
Both thejurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR commonly
hold that the actus reus is the superior's omission or failure to take
necessary and reasonable measures to: (1) prevent such acts; or
(2) punish the perpetrators. In ascertaining whether or not a superior
has done everything feasible to prevent or suppress war crimes, the
tribunal may consider the existence of a "causal nexus" between the
superior's failure to take measures and his/her subordinates'
commission of the serious international crimes.52
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
To date, the Philippines has still not ratified the ICC Statute.
Article 28 of the ICC Statute contains the latest international
developments on the doctrine of command responsibility:
Article 28. Responsibilities of Commanders and Other
Superiors.
In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility
under this Statute for crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court:"
'o Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement (16
November 1998); Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21 -A, para. 195 Celibici,
Appeals Judgement (20 February 2001).
" Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-1 Judgement (2 September
1998).
52 Hansen, supra note 8, at 379-384.
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(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a
military commander shall be criminally responsible
for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
committed byforces under his/her effective command
and control, or effective authority and control as the
case may be, as a result of his/her failure to exercise
control properly over such forces, where:
(i) That military commander or person either knew
or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should
have known that the forces were committing or
about to commit such crimes; and
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take
all necessary and reasonable measures within his/
her power to prevent or repress their commission
or to submit the matter to the competent authorities
for investigation and prosecution.
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships
not described in paragraph (a), a superior shall be
criminally responsible for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates
under his/her effective authority and control, as a result
of his/her failure to exercise control properly over such
subordinates, where:
(i) The superior either knew, or consciously dis-
regarded information which clearly indicated, that
the subordinates were committing or about to
commit such crimes;
(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within
the effective responsibility and control of the
superior; and
(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and
reasonable measures within his/her power to
prevent or repress their commission or to submit
the matter to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution.
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Article 28 contemplates both civilian and military superiors,
takes into account the possibility of defacto commanders and other
non-traditional superior-subordinate relationships. The crux of the
command-authority relationship is the existence of either "effective
command and control" or "effective authority or control" over the
subordinate. The mens rea requirement is either: (a) actual
knowledge; (b) imputed knowledge ("should have known" based on
the circumstances); or (c) constructive knowledge ("consciously
disregarded information which clearly indicated that subordinates
were committing or about to commit crimes"). The actus reus consists
of the omission or failure to take all necessary and reasonable
measures within the superior's power to: (a) prevent or repress the
commission of the crimes; or (b) submit the matter to competent
authorities for investigation and prosecution.
It should be noted, however, that Article 28 of the ICC Statute
explicitly holds superiors "criminally responsible" for the serious
international crimes committed by their subordinates. This augurs
the imposition of similar (if not identical) punishment upon both the
superior and the subordinate. However, this theoretical construct
has its share of detractors. It should likewise be bome in mind that
most municipal or national legal systems throughout the world require
that "perpetration be sharply differentiated from complicity" in terms
of the severity of punishment, and that it is largely the Anglo-American
and French criminal legal traditions that embrace an indiscriminate
approach to penalizing culpable and felonious conduct."
Joint Criminal Enterprises (JCE) under ICTY Jurisprudence
The ICTY drew from Nuremberg conspiracy law to devise
the concept of "joint criminal enterprises" (JCE). The first expression
of JCE doctrine is found in the appeals judgement in Tadic,5
differentiated between three types of collective criminality: (1) one
based on the shared intent of the superior and the subordinate, as
" Damaska, supra note 23, at 459.
54 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94- 1), Appeals Chamber Judgement,
§ 185 etseq. (15 July 1999).
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seen from their common design, common intention, or common
enterprise; (2) a "systemic" form of the enterprise, seen from cases
involving concentration camps, showing a common plan and unity
of purpose between the superior and the subordinate, and where
the superior bears personal knowledge of the engineered system
of ill treatment; and (3) "extended" joint enterprise where a co-
perpetrator acts beyond the common plan, but his/her acts are a
natural and foreseeable consequence of the realization of the plan.
(In this third type of collective criminality, all participants, whether
superior or subordinate, participate in the criminal purpose and act
to further this purpose. All participants contribute to the commission
of the crime.)" JCE doctrine can therefore establish the direct
responsibility of political and military leaders for "policy" crimes
executed by their rank and file subordinates based on an explicit
agreement or common design, as well as criminal responsibility for
the foreseeable consequences of the common design."6
JCE doctrine conceptually differs from the doctrine of
command responsibility by requiring a higher threshold of actual
positive overt acts through any "form of assistance in, or
contribution to, the execution of the common purpose" to commit
the acts comprising serious international crimes. Command
responsibility, on the other hand, is engaged simply from an actus
reus of omission.
JCE doctrine is not traceable to any particular provision of
the ICTY statute, but from jurisprudence of the ICTY since Tadic.
It is still in its nascent stages of development. It is fundamentally a
theory for conspiracy and complicity, and not criminal negligence
as contemplated in the doctrine of command responsibility. The
third form of JCE ("extended" joint enterprise) bears similarities to
the doctrine of command responsibility by providing a form of
"vicarious" liability for the acts of subordinates. However,
" Ambos, supra note 34, at 160-161; See Harmen Van der Wilt, Joint
Criminal Enterprise: Possibilities and Limitations, 5 J. INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 91
(2007).
6 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. T-98-33-T, Judgement, § 615 et seq.
(2 August 2001).
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considering its almost exclusive pattern of development from the
ICTYjurisprudence (supposedly traceable to Nuremberg and Tokyo
trial precedents), JCE doctrine remains one of the most complex
and highly challenged theories of liability in international criminal
law."
The Doctrine of Command Responsibility:
Criminal Liability of Civilian and Military Superiors
for Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines
The Melo Commission Report concluded that "responsibility
for the [extrajudicial] killings is limited to individual officers and
requires further proof of a wrongful act or omission."" The Report,
however, makes the following specific findings:
21. Summary/Notable Matters
a. The AFP did not conduct any formal investigation of
suspects, but admits a rise in reported killings.
b. General Esperon is convinced that the recent activist
and journalist killings were carried out by the CPP-
NPA as part of a "purge." Captured documents
supposedly prove this. The full contents or a copy of
the documents, however, were not presented to the
Commission.
c. Likewise, General Esperon was firm in his position
that the victims were members of the CPP-NPA and
that the activist organizations, while legal, are infiltrated
by the CPP-NPA. He stated that these organizations
are being manipulated by the NPA.
"Jacob A. Ramer, Hate by Association: Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability
for Persecution, 7 CHI-KENT J. INT'L. & CoMP. L. 31, at 37-61 (2007).
5 MELO COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 67.
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d. General Esperon admitted receiving reports about
Palparan being suspected of conducting extrajudicial
killings, being called Berdugo, etc. but he attributed
this to propaganda of CPP-NPA.
e. General Esperon admitted that no formal investigation
was conducted by the AFP on General Palparan, simply
because no complaint was filed. He mentioned that he
merely called General Palparan on his cell phone and
did not go beyond the latter's denials."
With respect to the widespread incidence of extrajudicial
killings in the areas of responsibility formerly under (retired) General
Jovito S. Palparan, the Commission held that no evidence was shown
that General Palparan was "called upon to account for and to explain
the same by his superiors," despite the fact that his "public
statements alone could have provoked disciplinary action against
him, not to mention court martial, for violation of the Articles of
War."160
The Commission expressly declared that "under the doctrine
of command responsibility, it was not proper to contend that no
action under the circumstances was taken because no complaint
had been lodged against General Palparan and/or that anyway,
Task Force USIG could very well have called him to account for
his actions and words." However, the Commission noted that the
President "recognized the need for official state action to address
what she felt was a disturbing rise in the number of killings of
media men and activists," thus creating "Task Force USIG to
prioritize the investigation of the killings."' The Commission did
not recommend the criminal prosecution of any specific superior,
military or otherwise, under the doctrine of command responsibility,
other than to generally call for the creation of independent agencies
to handle the investigation and prosecute the perpetrators of
" MELO COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 19.
60 Id. (fn. 60).
6" MELO COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 67 (fn. 60).
262 ASIA-PACIFIC YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
extrajudicial killings. Thereafter, recent news reports disclosed that
three generals had information that the extrajudicial killings of
activists were discussed in military command conferences .12
The Executive Secretary has publicly theorized that command
responsibility "applies only to military personnel and not the President
as Commander-in-Chief:"
In February, the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) came up with a memorandum on military
personnel's "strict adherence to the doctrine of
command responsibility."
Reading the document, Ermita said that "there
is such a thing as level of application."
"From what I understand... it applies to the next
higher [officials, usually] two ranks higher. For
example, if you're a company commander, it could apply
to the battalion commander and the brigade command-
er. It depends on the findings of the immediate
commander with their respective generals," he said.
Under the section "neglect of duty under the
doctrine of command responsibility," the document said
that "any AFP officer shall be held accountable for
neglect of duty under the doctrine of command
responsibility if he has knowledge that crime or offense
shall be committed, is being committed, or has been
committed by his subordinates, or by others within his
area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he
did not take preventive or corrective action either
before, during, or immediately after its commission."
62 Joel Guinto and Maila Ager. AFP dares generals to come open on
killings: Left dares Arroyo to sack, probe killings, in Philippine Daily Inquirer,
25 June 2007, available at: <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/
viewarticle.phparticleid=7317>. (Last visited I July 2007).
6 MELO COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 67 (fn. 30).
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Clearly, the Executive Secretary's theory (based on perceived
norms of militaryjustice) is completely incongruous to the customary
international legal doctrine of command responsibility, long
incorporated under Philippine jurisdiction. There is basis in the
Philippine legal system (which adopts the doctrine of command
responsibility as part of the laws of the land) to assign criminal
responsibility to military superiors such as General Palparan, and
civilian superiors such as the President, under the doctrine of
command responsibility. The essence of the doctrine is "criminal
negligence" of the highest degree, manifest from a superior's failure
or omission to supervise the conduct of his/her subordinates to
prevent, stop, and punish the commission of serious international
crimes.
As previously shown, criminal liability under the doctrine of
command responsibility is a separate legal regime that should be
treated distinctly from domestic penal law concepts of participation,
complicity, and inducement. The customary international legal
doctrine of command responsibility therefore cannot be seen as a
mere auxiliary of military justice.64 Throughout its genesis in
international law and up to its incorporation into the Philippine legal
system, the doctrine of command responsibility operates sui generis
to crystallize global rejection of impunity, and thus recognize strict
collective responsibility where serious international crimes, egregious
violations of human rights, and crimes against humanity are involved.
It is the "need for justice, the grievousness of the jus cogens
violations, and the evidentiary burden particular to superiors, [that]
has driven the doctrine of superior responsibility." Most importantly,
the doctrine of command responsibility is humanity's necessary
tool to deter serious international crimes by deliberately dis-
" See James W. Smith 111, A Few Good Scapegoats: The Abu Ghraib
Courts-Martial and the Failure of the Military Justice System, 27 WHITTIER L.
REv. 61 (2006).
6 Avi Singh, Criminal Responsibility for Non-State Civilian Superiors
Lacking De Jure Authority: A Comparative Review ofthe Doctrine ofSuperior
Responsibility and Parallel Doctrines in National Criminal Laws, 28 HASTINGS
INT'L. & Comp. L. REv. 267, at 284-285 (2005).
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incentivizing a superior's culpable negligence and omission to
supervise, control, prevent, and punish the felonious conduct of his/
her subordinates. The doctrine should not lose its potency due to
(deliberate or involuntary) misapprehension and confusion with
domestic penal law concepts.
The findings in the Melo Commission Report should therefore
suffice to initiate criminal prosecution against superiors such as
General Palparan. No legislation is necessary since criminal liability
under the doctrine of command responsibility (as a norm of
customary international law explicitly recognized by the Supreme
Court in Yamashita and Kuroda) has the status of law in the
Philippines."6
Applying the four elements of the doctrine of command
responsibility as incorporated under Philippine jurisdiction (and
subject to further factual supplementation and verification), there
is basis to impute criminal liability to General Palparan. First, it is
undeniable that there is a clear command authority relationship
between him and the subordinates accused of perpetrating the
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances of activists and
media personnel. Second, as seen from his own public statements
to the media which were enumerated under the Melo Commission
Report," General Palparan clearly had information of the
prevalence of the extrajudicial killings and their attributability to
his subordinates, which triggered his affirmative duty to act to
prevent, stop, investigate, and punish the commission of such crimes,
but General Palparan refused to fulfill this duty, and even offered
words of encouragement to those responsible. As precisely found
by the Commission:
General Palparan's numerous public statements
caught on film or relayed through print media give the
overall impression that he is not a bit disturbed by the
" See Mijares et al. v. Ranada et al., GR. No. 139325, 12 April 2005;
Minucher v Court ofAppeals et al., GR. No. 142396, 11 February 2003.
67 MELO COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 53-57.
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extrajudicial killings of civilian activists, whom he
considers enemies of the state. He admits having uttered
statements that may have encouraged the said killings.
He also obviously condones these killings, by failing to
properly investigate the possibility that his men may have
been behind them.
General Palparan's statements and cavalier
attitude towards the killings inevitably reveals that he
has no qualms about the killing of those whom he
considers his enemies, whether by his order or done by
his men independently. He mentions that if his men kill
civilians suspected of NPA connection, "it is their call,"
obviously meaning that it is up to them to do so. This
gives the impression that he may not order the killings,
but neither will he order his men to desist from doing so.
Under the doctrine of command responsibility, General
Palparan admitted his guilt of the said crimes when he
made his statement. Worse, he admittedly offers
encouragement and "inspiration" to those who may have
been responsible for the killings.
He also admits to having helped in the creation of
so-called "barangay defense forces," which may or may
not be armed, to prevent the entry of CPP-NPA in such
barangays. Such defense forces are equivalent to an
unofficial civilian militia. It is well known that such militia
can easily degenerate into a mindless armed mob, where
the majority simply lord it over the minority. This is a
fertile situation for extrajudicial killings. In this way,
General Palparan contributed to the extrajudicial killings
by creating ideal situations for their commission and by
indirectly encouraging them"8 [emphasis supplied].
The third element of the doctrine of command responsibility
(actus reus, or the superior's omission or failure to fulfill his/her
6 MELO COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 56.
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affirmative duty to prevent, stop, investigate, and punish his/her
subordinates' commission of serious international crimes, egregious
violations of human rights, torture, and crimes against humanity) is
likewise satisfied from the foregoing findings of the Commission.
Significantly, the Commission itself found the presence of a causal
nexus between General Palparan's omission and his subordinates'
commission of the extrajudicial killings when it held that General
Palparan "contributed to the extrajudicial killings by creating ideal
situations for their commission and by indirectly encouraging them."
Thus, the fourth element of the doctrine necessarily applies, such
that General Palparan should be criminally liable and punished with
the same penalty as that prescribed for the serious international crimes,
torture, crimes against humanity, and egregious human rights violations
committed by his subordinates.
The assignment of criminal liability need not be restricted to
General Palparan. Where factual findings likewise satisfy the four
elements of the doctrine of command responsibility under customary
international law as incorporated into Philippine jurisdiction, other
military superiors in the Armed Forces of the Philippines can likewise
be criminally prosecuted by Philippine prosecutors and held criminally
liable by Philippine courts. Due to the presence of customary legal
doctrine of command responsibility in the Philippine legal system, the
attribution of responsibility need not be confined within the auspices
ofthe militaryjustice system (or even restricted to mere administrative
liability). There being no legal impediment to the use of the doctrine
of command responsibility as a basis for deriving criminal liability in
Philippine jurisdiction, prosecutors should not hesitate to draw up
and file the corresponding information against superiors under the
four definitive elements of the doctrine of command responsibility.
In turn, courts should not be reluctant to issue convictions where the
evidence presented supports all four elements of the doctrine of
command responsibility.
Finally, can civilian superiors such as the President, as
commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,69 be
6 1987 CONST., Article 7, § 18.
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held criminally liable under the customary international law doctrine
of command responsibility as incorporated in Philippinejurisdiction?
Bypassing the issue of the President's suability during her
term, it is submitted that, subject to factual verification and submission
of evidence, there should be no hindrance to imputing criminal liability
later to a (non-sitting former) head of state such as the President
under the customary international law doctrine of command
responsibility.70 The customary status of the doctrine admits of
application to civilian superiors such as former heads of state."
This is fully consistent with the underlying rationale for the international
criminal legal system, which rejects impunity in whatever form for
perpetrators of crimes against humanity and egregious human rights
violations.72
70 See Estrada v. Desierto, et al., G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and 146738, 2
March 2000; Romualdez v Sandiganbayan et al., GR. No. 152259, 29 July
2004.
71 Vetter, supra note 31, at 94 says:
Command responsibility cases decided in the wake of
World War II as well as recent events demonstrate that civilian
superiors can be intimately associated with violations of human
rights law. Civilian superiors should be held no less accountable
than military commanders for their involvement with, complicity
in, or lack of diligence contributing to these crimes, as long as
civilian accountability does not extend beyond an objectively
justifiable capability to control subordinates, know of atrocities,
and take action to stop them or punish the subordinate offenders.
n See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) G.A. Res.
217A (III), UN Doc. A/810 Article 8, (1948); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, UN
Doc. A/6316 (1966), Article 2(3) 999 UNTS 171; American Convention, O.A.S.
Treaty Series No. 36, (1982) Articles 1.1, 2, & 7, 1144 UNTS 123; European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article
13, 213 UNTS 222, entered into force 3 September 1953, as amended by Protocols
Nos. 3, 5, 8, and 11 which entered intoforce on 21 September 1970, 20 December
1971, 1 January 1990, and 1 November 1998 respectively; M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, Dordrecht,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992, p. 224; C.C. Joyner, Redressing Impunity for
Human Rights Violations: The Universal Declaration and the Search for
Accountability, 26 DENVER J. INT'L. L. & PoL'Y 591, at 613; M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Crimes Against Humanity: The NeedforA Specialized Convention, 31 CoLuM. J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 457, at 463 (1994).
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In the case of the President, a preliminary finding (and subject
to additional factual verification and supplementation) of the existence
of the four elements of the doctrine of command responsibility can
be made:
First, there is a clear command authority relationship
between the President and her subordinates in the armed
forces. The Constitution vests upon the President as
commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
"absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members
of the armed forces," which authority "includes the ability of
the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of
military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned
under civilian law."" Applying the test of "effective control,"
it is clear that the President's command authority exists in
relation to the subordinates-perpetrators. Given her vast
constitutional powers, the President clearly has both the material
ability to "prevent and punish the commission" of serious
international crimes by her subordinates.
Second, based on official government reports,
international reportage by global and regional human rights
institutions, and widespread regular reporting ofthe local media,
the President has long had information"4 of the prevalence of
extrajudicial killings and their attributability to members of her
armed forces. Clearly, the President's affirmative duty to
prevent, stop, investigate, and punish the commission of
extrajudicial killings had long been triggered.
7Tird, other than the relatively recent creation of Task
Force USIG and the Melo Commission, the President has not
taken necessary, concrete, and reasonable measures to prevent,
7 Gudani et al. v. Senga el al., G.R. No. 170165, 15 August 2006.
" See Report of Special Rapporteur, Philip Alston, "Civil and Political
Rights, Including the Questions of Disappearances and Summary Executions:
Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions," E/CN.4/2005/7 (22 December
2004) United Nations Economic and Social Council. Found at: <http://
www.extrajudicialexecutions.org/reports/ECN_4_2005_7.pdf> (Last visited I
July 2007).
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stop, investigate, and punish the commission of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances. Since the earliest
reportage of incidents of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances up to the present date, there is no showing
that the President has initiated any military investigation or
criminal prosecution against General Palparan and other
military persons identified in the Melo Commission Report.
Analogizing from the Melo Commission Report findings on
General Palparan, it may likewise be said that the President
contributed to the incidence of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances by creating "ideal situations for their
commission" due to her glaring omission: (1) to maintain the
continuous and efficient operation of the command oversight
system under the armed forces; and (2) to investigate and
cause the prosecution of subordinates-perpetrators of the
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, which
constitute serious international crimes, torture, crimes against
humanity, and egregious human rights violations.
Of course, the causal nexus between the President's
omissions and her subordinates' commission of such crimes is
a matter of evidence and proof that will determine the extent
of the President's actus reus. But for purposes of applying
the customary international legal doctrine of command
responsibility, there is arguably some preliminary basis to impute
criminal liability for the President's "criminal negligence of the
highest degree."
Fourth, should all of the foregoing elements be fully
substantiated, under the present content of the customary
international legal doctrine of command responsibility, the
President can be held equally liable for the same punishment
prescribed for her subordinates that perpetrated such serious
international crimes, torture, crimes against humanity, and other
egregious human rights violations.
The foregoing analysis illustrates how the doctrine of command
responsibility can be applied in Philippine criminal jurisdiction as a
separate and distinct schema for deriving the criminal responsibility
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of military and civilian superiors. In the particular context of
proliferating extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in the
Philippines, there should be no legal hindrance to criminal prosecution
of both the subordinate-perpetrator and the negligent superior. Under
the customary international legal doctrine of command responsibility
long incorporated into the Philippine legal system, the legal platform
and conceptual tools for allocating criminal responsibility to both
superiors and subordinates have long been available. What is urgently
needed now is the political will, civilian courage, and judicial
independence to fully harness these tools-and arrest both the
perception and reality of the Philippines' growing culture of impunity
for serious international crimes, torture, crimes against humanity, and
other egregious human rights violation.
Conclusion
As seen in the present controversy on the doctrine of command
responsibility, doctrinal confusion can engender deplorable inaction
and foment impunity for serious international crimes. There is no
rhyme or reason why civilian and military superiors in the Philippines
should be insulated or immunized from criminal liability for their glaring
omissions and failure to prevent, stop, investigate, and punish serious
international crimes. Accountability should not be stonewalled by a
mere mirage.
Apart from shoring up the obvious fiction of the absence of
"effective remedies" for victims of the extrajudicial killings, enforced
disappearances, and other egregious human rights violations and
crimes against humanity, the Philippine government's long-standing
failure to utilize the doctrine of command responsibility constitutes
separate breaches of several international obligations." These
obligations include, among others: (1) the duty to prosecute persons
" See Jan Arno Hessbruege, The Historical Development ofthe Doctrines
ofAttribution and Due Diligence in International Law, 36 N.Y.U.J. INT'L. L. &
POL. 265 (2004).
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committing serious international crimes and crimes against
humanity;" (2) the duty to ensure that there is no "denial ofjustice"
to persons residing or sojourning in Philippine territory, due to "bad
faith, the willful neglect of duty, or an insufficiency of governmental
action so far short of international standards that every reasonable
and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency"n and
(3) the duty to protect the fundamental human right of all persons
to an effective remedy.78
It is with some irony that it is the judiciary, and not the
executive branch of the Philippine government (which is headed
by the ultimate "civilian" superior in the person of the President),
that has taken the direct initiative to address issues of responsibility
and criminal liability for extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances through concrete proposals to revise the present
legal framework. These proposals, however, need not require the
reinvention of the wheel. As previously discussed, the Philippine
legal system has long incorporated the customary international legal
doctrine of command responsibility, under four distinct elements:
(1) the existence of command authority and responsibility between
the superior and the subordinate; (2) the mens rea, or the existence
of information triggering an affirmative duty on the part of the
commander; (3) the actus reus, or the superior's omissions, failure
76 D. F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duly to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L. J. 2357 (199 1).
7 JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 68-69
(2006 ed.).
" Article 8 ofthe Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 2(3) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 6 of the
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; Article 2(c) of the
Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination Against Women;
Article 14 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment; Article 16 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child;
Article 11(3) of the American Convention on Human Rights; Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights; Article 5 of the African Charter on
Human and Peoples Rights; Articles 16(4) and 16(5) ofthe Convention Concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, ILO No. 69, 27 June
1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382.
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of supervision, or foreseeable negligence and their causal nexus
with the subordinate's crime; and (4) the imputation to the superior
of the same criminal liability and punishment for which the
subordinate is liable.
Thus, for purposes of initiating criminal prosecution now in
the context of the ongoing extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, the Philippine legal system already contains the
legal standards to prosecute and convict both subordinates-
perpetrators and superiors. It is for the victims, the prosecutors,
and the judges to fully apply this historic doctrine-which, uniquely,
traces its origins to the Philippines.
Nevertheless, recent refinements to the doctrine of command
responsibility (as enumerated in this analysis) still do not bear the
status of customary international law. As such, they cannot be
deemed incorporated into the Philippine legal system until their
crystallization as custom. It is for the Philippine Legislature to
determine whether these refinements. (on mens rea, actus reus,
prescribed punishment, and even the concept of joint criminal
enterprises) should be specifically adopted into law.
With the continuous rise of extrajudicial killings, enforced
disappearances, and other glaring state-sanctioned or state-condoned
violations of fundamental human rights, there is particular urgency
in this case to "begin action" by "speaking of the unspeakable.""9
Confusion about the scope and demarcations of the doctrine of
command responsibility should not silence victims of serious
international crimes, torture, crimes against humanity, and egregious
human rights violations. Neither should confusion serve as the
refuge of subordinates-perpetrators and superiors-architects of these
crimes.
7 Id., at note 1.
